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Peacekeeping:  Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
SUMMARY
For over a decade, some Members of
Congress have expressed reservations about -
U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping.
The Bush Administration’s decision to reduce
the commitment of U.S. troops to interna-
tional peacekeeping seems to reflect a major
concern: that peacekeeping duties are detri-
mental to military “readiness,” i.e., the ability
of U.S. troops to defend the nation.  Others,
however, view peacekeeping and related
stability operations as a necessary feature of
the United States’ current and possible future
U.S. military activities.  With the U.S.-led
occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a
“stabilization and reconstruction” operation
(which manifests some characteristics of a
peace operation), concerns about whether U.S.
forces are large enough and  appropriately
configured to carry out that operation over
several years dominate that debate.  These
concerns were heightened by the 9/11 Com-
mission report, which cited Afghanistan,
where the Administration has limited U.S.
involvement in peacekeeping and nation-
building, as a sanctuary for terrorists and
pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and
potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist. 
Thousands of U.S. military personnel
currently serve in or support peacekeeping
operations.  The number of troops serving in
U.N. operations has decreased dramatically
since the mid-1990s.  About 24 U.S.
servicemembers are serving  in five operations
under U.N. control.  In the Balkans, U.S.
troops were withdrawn from the NATO Stabi-
lization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia as a result of
the December 2, 2004 end of that mission, but
some 1,500 remained with the NATO Kosovo
Force (KFOR).  About 30,000 more serve in
or support peacekeeping operations in South
Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai.   In
Iraq, some U.S. troops are involved in low-
intensity combat while at the same time
performing “nation-building” tasks that have
been undertaken in some peacekeeping
operations, as are a few hundred U.S. troops
in Afghanistan.  DOD refers to the latter two
as “stabilization” or “stability” operations.
The military “readiness” issue factored
heavily into the debate over peacekeeping
from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s.
Some policymakers  worried that peacekeep-
ing costs were draining funds that DOD used
to prepare its forces to defend against a threat
to U.S. vital interests, that peacekeeping
deployments stressed a force whose size was
inadequate to handle such operations, and that
troops deployed on such operations lost their
facility for combat tasks.  In the 108th Con-
gress, the readiness issue  morphed into a
capabilities issue, which is likely to continue
into the 109th Congress, even though
peacekeeping deployments are substantially
reduced. 
With some policymakers and analysts
arguing that the uncertainties of the post-
September 11 world demand a greater U.S.
commitment to curbing ethnic instability, a
major issue Congress continues to face is
what, if any, adjustments should be made in
order for the U.S. military to perform
peacekeeping and stability missions — in
Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less
strain on the force, particularly the reserves.
Of particular interest is whether the size and
configuration of U.S. forces, especially the
Army, should be further modified. Additional
issues are whether to augment civilian and
international capabilities in order to take over





 On May 17, 2005, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the
FY2006 Department of Defense (DOD) authorization bill, S. 1042; its accompanying report,
S.Rept. 109-69, commends DOD support for the new State Department reconstruction and
stabilization office and urges DOD “to deepen its coordination” with the State Department
in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping.  These have ranged from the basic question of definition (what is
“peacekeeping” and, more recently, how does it relate to “stabilization,” “peace
enforcement,” “reconstruction” and “nation-building”?) to the broad strategic question (how
and when does it serve U.S. interests?) to related practical questions (which tasks, if any,
must be performed by the U.S. military and which can be delegated to other entities?).
Recently, congressional attention regarding U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping
focuses on three issues.   For many Members, the salient issue is whether there is a need for
the U.S. military to maintain a long-term peacekeeping, or “stabilization and reconstruction”
presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans.   The second is the suitability and desirability
of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping and related missions in general, and if deployed,
the appropriate role for the military in those situation and the roles that should be taken on
by U.S. civilian or international forces.  The third is a two-sided capabilities issue: to what
extent do peacekeeping and related operations impair the U.S. military’s warfighting
capability (“readiness”), and, conversely, to what extent should the U.S. armed forces be
reorganized to perform peacekeeping effectively so as to alleviate undue stress on the forces?
Although the costs of peacekeeping per se are not as salient an issue as they were
several years ago, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military
assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs  (i.e., the costs over
and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime)
of the larger contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. Cost
issues are not addressed in this issue brief.  For more information on incremental costs,
supplemental appropriations and on attempts to create more efficient methods of funding
contingency operations, see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia,
Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers, and CRS Report RL32141,
Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents.  For
information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations
Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.
The Definitional Problem
“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad
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hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or
enhance the possibilities for peace.  These activities range from providing election observers,
re-creating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries,
organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and
enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.
The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma:  no single term currently in
use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations.
Use of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are
without risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations
resembling war.  To further complicate the problem of definition, as the concept of
peacekeeping has become discredited in the United States, the terminology has shifted.  For
DOD and many analyses aimed at a DOD audiences, many of these same activities are now
encompassed under the rubrics of “stabilization” and “reconstruction” operations.
The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United
Nations peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition:  providing an “interpositional”
force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had
signed.  In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the
different types of peacekeeping activities.  In particular, it created the term “peace
enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed
to use force because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety.  (For some
military analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and
low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has some degree
of local consent.)  Subsequently, U.S. executive branch agencies substituted the term “peace
operations” for “peacekeeping.” Since the early 2000s, the Department of Defense more
often uses the term “stability” operations to refer to peace operations (although the term also
encompasses other non-combat operations, such as counterdrug operations), and undertakes
some peace tasks in the context of reconstruction assistance.  Congress has tended to use the
term “peacekeeping,” as does this issue brief. 
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the
1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel
participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping
operations, most endorsed by the United Nations. Very few U.S. military personnel currently
serve under U.N. command.  As of April 30, 2005, 29 U.S. military personnel were serving
in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations.  These operations are located in the Middle
East (3 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs),
Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs), Liberia (7 milobs and 6 troops), and Haiti (4 troops).  Other U.S.
forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken
with U.N. authority.  As of the end of 2004, U.S. troops were withdrawn from Bosnia with
the December 2 end of the NATO operation there, but some 1,500 remained with the NATO
operation in Kosovo, with others supporting them from Macedonia. (Numbers have
fluctuated by the hundreds with troop rotations.)  Roughly 700 serve in the Sinai-based
coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation. 
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The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not
counted as, peacekeeping.  Roughly some 30,000 U.S. troops have been serving in South
Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although
technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward
presence mission.)  On June 7, 2004, South Korean officials announced that the United
States intended to withdraw about a third of the 37,000  troops serving at that time by the end
of 2005.  No U.S. troops serve in the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan,
although some 11,000 U.S. troops are present there in other roles, including a few hundred
involved in nation-building activities (see section on Afghanistan, below). 
The Bush Administration Policy
Despite President Bush’s stated dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions
involving U.S. ground forces during his first presidential campaign, as President he has been
willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary.  (For
a discussion of candidate and President Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report
RL31109, NATO: Issues for Congress, by Paul E. Gallis.)  During his Administration, Bush
has sought and achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has
resisted calls to provide U.S. troops for the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.
In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the
United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved
to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of  Iraq falls in a gray area that
defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define as low-intensity conflict
rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken
there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the Bush
Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons
of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in
Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.
Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo.  The Bush Administration sought to minimize
forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S.
allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia dropped
steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia
Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000 in 2004.  U.S.
participation ended on  December 2, 2004, when the European Union assumed responsibility
for the operation.  U.S. troops may continue to play some role as NATO continues to support
the EU with intelligence and assistance in apprehending indicted war criminals.  (See CRS
Report RS21774, Bosnia and International Security Forces: Transition from NATO to the
European Union in 2004.)  Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo has dropped from some
5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 1,500.  (These
numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.)  In both cases, these reductions have
taken place in the context of an overall reduction of forces serving in the NATO
peacekeeping missions.
NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan.   For some time,
the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in
peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), despite calls
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by some analysts for a U.S. role.  With some 8,800 troops contributed by 37 NATO and non-
NATO nations as of May 2005 ([http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-
factsheet.htm]), ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N.
Chapter VII authorization and is expanding throughout the country.  (NATO assumed
command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, just over 18 months after ISAF was formed in
January 2002 as an ad hoc coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations under
British command.)  The United States has some 11,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan,
according to DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but others in support,
training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF, i.e.,
logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support, but they do not engage in ISAF
peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of
an Afghani national military force, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building.”
Hundreds of U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the establishment
and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create
a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside
Kabul.  Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel (Special Forces and civil affairs
reservists) and civilians.  As of May 2005, the United States operated 11 PRTs, down from
13 the previous month after two U.S. operated PRTs were taken over by ISAF forces.  ISAF
involvement in PRTs began on January 6, 2004, when ISAF (by now under NATO) marked
the beginning of its operations outside Kabul by taking over the German-led PRT in Konduz.
(As of the end of May 2005, ISAF ran 8 PRTs and two forward support bases and planned
to take on two more PRTs in the near future.) Although the U.S. military role in PRTs is not
identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives — enhancing security, extending the reach of the
central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are similar to those of peacekeeping
operations. Some analysts consider it “nation-building.”  Thus far, the PRTs have not proven
controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian organizations have taken issue with
them.  (For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, and the section on nation-building below.) 
Issues Regarding an Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in
Iraq.   U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of
which are counterinsurgency (i.e., combat) operations but some of which are generally
classified as peacekeeping and related stability operations.  The type of activities undertaken
by U.S. troops varies from area to area, and some commanders have noted that their troops
are doing a mix of both types of operations.  (However, counterinsurgency techniques
include humanitarian and political activities which are also carried out in peace operations.)
In the face of what many analysts have perceived as a continuing climate of general
lawlessness and insecurity, some critics argue that the United States should deploy a greater
number of troops, particularly military police, to provide greater stability.   Many argue that
an extensive force will be needed for several years to perform a wide spectrum of tasks,
particularly providing continuing peacekeeping duties such as providing basic security while
Iraqi police and military forces are reconstituted.  The deployment is straining U.S. forces,
however, as the June 2, 2004 “stop loss” announcement that soldiers would not be allowed
to retire within 90 days of deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan, and the subsequent
announcement to withdraw a third of U.S. soldiers from Korea, were attributed to difficulties
in maintaining a sufficient number of troops in Iraq.  (See CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S.




Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in
particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping
operations, and by extension, the related “stabilization” and “reconstruction” tasks of other
post-combat environments.  One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts
and skills to be fighters, while the instincts and skills needed for peacekeeping are those
inculcated by law enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the
military’s training to work in highly-disciplined units and employ higher levels of force are
seen as inculcating skills necessary for effective performance.)  Another reason is that
peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations.  Many senior U.S.
military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force.  U.S.
troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy.  Most peacekeeping tasks,
however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” use of force.
As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed
their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on
peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a
good soldier.  (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states  the
Army field manual on peace operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed to former U.N.
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.)  In part this argument is based on the recognition that
troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to
unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that the most credible deterrent to
those “spoilers” who would disrupt the peace is a soldier well-trained for combat.  U.S.
military participation in peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by military
officers who have found that although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”), peace operations
can enhance other non-combat skills necessary for combat operations.  A July 2004 Heritage
Foundation report, Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq by James Jay Carafano,
argues that the armed services should create schools designed to teach concepts and practices
needed for post-conflict missions. 
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces.
On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,”  U.S.
troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those
who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S.
forces.  On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces
if the United States does not. 
Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building.  In the wake of U.S.
military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed
in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building.”  Like peacekeeping,
nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and a
variety of activities.  On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of creating
(or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation.   The term is
also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries or civilians
undertake to advance that goal.  (A recent RAND report, America’s Role in Nation-Building
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from Germany to Iraq, uses the term to encompass the full range of activities undertaken by
the United States, including by its military forces, in operations that have been variously
known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction.)
As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range
of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid  in emergency
situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of
economic infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities,
and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities.
They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to
refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military,
the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.  
During the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping
operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In
Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led-UNITAF was
engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and
hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved
in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of
establishing security. These two experiences, which are often regarded as failed or at best
inconclusive experiments, stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members
as an inefficient use of military resources. 
Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts assert the need for military involvement
in such tasks, particularly in the absence of other personnel able to undertake such in the
immediate aftermath of major combat.  Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential
elements in stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical and
organizations infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such
activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of  weak
central governments as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local
populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces.  Sometimes, involvement in such
activities may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security
situation in an area.   Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential
element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation (p. 367)
to use all elements of national power “to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run...”
In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military
forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks.  In hostile environments,
armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance.
(A Heritage Foundation analyst argues that basic post-conflict tasks, such as providing
security and related logistics for the reestablishment of civilian government and authority,
must be done by the military, although he argues against the use of the U.S. military for
peacekeeping, and broader “nation-building” tasks.  See Post Conflict and Culture:
Changing America’s Military for 21st Century Missions, October 22, 2003, available through
[http://www.heritage.org].)
In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for
such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks.  Such critics feel that
the use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and
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establishment of civilian control.    Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in
the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and
makes them targets of armed opponents.   In Afghanistan, humanitarian groups have charged
that U.S. soldiers were endangering their workers by wearing civilian dress while
undertaking humanitarian activities; some have viewed the U.S. military as “inadequately
prepared” for its rural reconstruction efforts there.  (Combat role strains relations between
America’s military and its NGOs.  Humanitarian Affairs Review. Summer 2003, p. 29).
Many have urged that the U.S. military not undertake such projects in Iraq.
Legislation to Improve Civilian Capabilities
Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks.  Several proposals to
build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule of law tasks, in
peacekeeping operations have been advanced.  Among the arguments made in their favor are
that they could relieve stress on military forces. No legislation was passed in the 108th
Congress despite the introduction of three bills, but some of the proposed ideas were taken
into consideration in the State Department’s establishment, in July 2004, of a new Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).  S/CRS’ function is to
develop proposals and mechanisms to enhance civilian capabilities, and to improve inter-
agency coordination in planning and conduction stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Defense analysts and military experts have provided much of the impetus for the
concept of developing civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction missions.
Most recently, the Defense Science Board Summer 2004 study entitled Transition to and
from Hostilities supported the development of civilian capabilities.  Presented to DOD in
December 2004, the study described the stabilization and reconstruction mission as
“inescapable, its importance irrefutable” and argued that both DOD and the Department of
State need to augment stabilization and reconstruction capabilities and to develop “an
extraordinarily close working relationship.”  In addition, the study found that the State
Department needs “to develop a capacity for operational planning [that] it does not currently
possess” and to develop “a more robust capacity to execute such plans.” (pp 38-39.  See
below for a synopsis of its other findings and recommendations regarding stabilization
operations and the link to the Defense Science Board website.)  
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying the FY2006 DOD
authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69, May 17, 2005), noted the establishment of
S/CRS and commended DOD’s “active support of and cooperation with this new office” and
urged DOD “to continue to deepen its coordination with the Department of State on planning
for and participating in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts.  S. 1042,
Section 212 directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a field experiment in FY2006 in
order “to explore critical challenges” in the planning and execution of military and support
activities required in post-conflict situations after major combat operations and to aid in the
development of relevant policy, doctrine, training, infrastructure, and organizational
structures.  Section 212 specifies that participants shall include elements of the Army, the
Marine Corps, the Special Operations Command, representatives of DOD policy “elements,”
and “appropriate elements of other departments and agencies of the United States
Government, and of such elements and forces of coalition nations, as the Secretary considers
appropriate....”  A report on the experiment is to be submitted by January 31, 2007.  S.Rept.
106-69 states that the Committee views DOD “as only one element of stability and support
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activities in the post-conflict environment” and urges not only the participation of other U.S.
government civilian departments and agencies and coalition partners in the joint field
experiment, but also in formulating recommendations “to ensure that a comprehensive U.S.
Government and coalition approach to future stability and support activities is developed.”
The Bush Administration has made two 2005 funding requests for S/CRS and related
projects.  In H.R. 1268 (P.L. 109-13, signed into law May 11, 2005, the FY2005 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief
Act), Congress provided the Senate’s $7.7 million (of the $17.2 million requested) for S/CRS
operations, up from the House’s $3 million.  The Bush Administration’s FY2006 budget
request includes $24.1 million for the S/CRS operations.  In addition, the Administration
asks for the creation in FY2006 of a $100 million for a no-year contingency Conflict
Response Fund that would be administered by S/CRS and could be used “to prevent or
respond to conflict or civil strife in foreign countries or regions, or to enable transition from
such strife.”   The Senate version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and
FY2007 (S. 600), reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 10, 2005,
authorizes virtually full funding for both FY2006 requests.  The House version, H.R. 2601,
as introduced, contains no S/CRS funding.   (For further details on S/CRS and relevant
legislation, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities.)
Program to Improve African Nations’ Capabilities 
The Bush Administration proposed a five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), to prepare other, largely African, nations to participate in peacekeeping
operations.  GPOI’s primary goal is to train and equip some 75,000 military forces, and to
develop gendarme forces (also known constabulary police, i.e., police with military skills)
to participate in peacekeeping operations.  The Administration estimated the U.S. cost at
$661 million from FY2005-FY2009.   For 2005, Congress appropriated some $100 million
for GPOI in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447).  Section 117
of Section J of the act provided authority for the transfer of $80 million from DOD to the
State Department, which according to DOD officials is to be used for GPOI.  An earlier
section of the bill (Division D) contains $20 million in State Department funding for the
program.  The Bush Administration has requested $114 million in State Department funding
for GPOI in GY2006.    The Senate version of the State Department authorization bill for
FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600) authorizes $114.4 million for FY2006 and such sums as may
be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI; the House version (H.R. 2601) contains no GPOI
funding.  (For more information, see CRS Report RL32773:  The Global Peace Operations
Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.)
Military Capabilities Issue:  Readiness vs. Adequacy 
Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations
has taken two different forms.  During the 1990s, critics of the commitment of U.S. military
personnel to peacekeeping operations drove the readiness debate.  As the U.S. military was
increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the
same time as it was downsized significantly — many Members questioned whether U.S.
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military forces could perform their “core” war-fighting mission to protect U.S. vital interests
if they engaged extensively in other activities. Opponents of such commitments, particularly
in areas they regarded as irrelevant to key U.S. interests, argued that they impaired the
military’s capability or “readiness” to defend the nation.  Today, those who view
peacekeeping operations as a necessary, albeit not primary, role for U.S. armed forces,
particularly the Army, have reframed the debate, arguing that the U.S. military should be
adequately structured and sized to perform such operations without putting undue stress on
individual soldiers and units.
The Readiness Debate  
There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of  readiness, which was
always a subjective and ambiguous concept. Peacekeeping (and all other operations other
than war) is directly related to the readiness problem, if viewed strictly in terms of the
readiness ratings that are calculated periodically.  That is because the standards that are used
to measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness; that is, its ability
to fight and win wars.  These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the
state of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their
wartime skills.  When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping
operations, scores on these measures can decline, as they did in the latter half of the 1990s.
There were a variety of reasons for such declines, some of which were addressed by
changes in military practices.   First,  military personnel cannot continue to practice all their
combat skills when participating in peace operations; second, the U.S. military has been
deployed for peacekeeping operations at the same time that the size of the force, particularly
the army, has been reduced substantially; third, funds for training and equipment have been
diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and fourth, units were disrupted by the
deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals to a peacekeeping operation.
(Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends
on one’s perspective on the utility of  readiness measures. Those who believe that
peacekeeping and related operations are significant missions and important to U.S. national
security have argued that readiness standards should also measure, or otherwise account for,
performance of peacekeeping tasks.)   
If one looked at the larger “readiness” problem of the 1990s and early 2000s, that is the
perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that military equipment was in
poor shape, that there were rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military could not
recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less
pronounced, according to some analysts.  Some have argued that the readiness problem was
exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in
Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.  Others have argued that peacekeeping was
responsible to some extent for this larger readiness problem, but there were many
contributing factors, such as the strong economy and the advanced age of equipment and
spare parts.  The area in which peacekeeping most affected readiness are the stresses that
frequent deployments placed on certain troops, measured through the increases in operational
tempo (optempo), i.e., the pace of a unit’s activities and personnel tempo (perstempo), i.e.,
the rate of deployments.
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Assessing and Adjusting for the Effects of Peacekeeping and
Related Operations on Military Forces
The military’s ability to perform peacekeeping operations while retaining its
preparedness to fight wars depends on several factors.  Most salient among them are the size
of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length,
and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat
skills while deployed on peacekeeping and related operations. 
Deployment Strains.  The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes
time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful
life of equipment.  The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army.
For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping
operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by
keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.
In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the
GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping
together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and
“heavily”stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation
units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of an major regional
contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an
MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in forces needed for
contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps
land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully- trained and available Air Force AWACS aircraft crews,
and fully-trained U-2 pilots.
The Army took steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better
management of its resources, as did the Air Force. In recent years, the army addressed
perstempo strains by limiting deployments to six months (although this was overridden by
deployments to Iraq), and including national guard and reserve units among those on the
roster to serve in the Balkans, thus attempting to reduce the optempo of combat duty units.
The Air Force, beginning in 1999, established Air Expeditionary Units to deploy under a
predictable rotation system.  In some cases, however, these solutions may generate other
problems.  For instance, the Army’s attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments
on its active forces by instead  deploying reservists may have, some analysts worry, affected
Guard and Reserve personnel recruitment and retention.  (See section on the use of reserves,
below.)  Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements in resource
management could ease stresses.  Others prefer to change force size or structure.
Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Operations
The appropriate size and structure for the military depends largely on the types of wars
that it is expected to fight and the range of missions that it is expected to perform.  A decade
and a half after the end of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers are still debating how best to
define the future threats to U.S. security and the appropriate configuration of U.S. military
force to counter them. Since the early 1990s, many defense analysts, military officers, and
policymakers have questioned whether the military, especially the Army, is appropriately
sized and structured to perform all the tasks assigned to it.  As the deployment strains, noted
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in the GAO reports cited above, became evident, many Members have argued that the U.S.
military is too small and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations.  In response, some
urged that the United States reduce or eliminate such missions, others urged changes in the
force to better accommodate peacekeeping missions.  The Iraq occupation has intensified this
debate.  (See the Heritage Foundation’s Reducing the Stress on an Overstretched Force by
Jack Spencer, August 1, 2003, arguing for the more effective use of uniformed personnel and
a reduction of peacekeeping commitments before increasing the number of U.S. troops.) 
Increasing Use of Reserves in Peacekeeping and Related Operations.
Over the past decade, but especially since 9/11, the U.S. military has increasingly called upon
Army, Air Force, and Navy reserve forces and National Guardsmen for peacekeeping and
related operations.  (These forces are known collectively as “the reserve,” “reservists,” and
“the reserve component.”)  These deployments have raised issues regarding the appropriate
division of labor between active and reserve forces, and the extent to which reserve forces
can be used without jeopardizing their ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel.   
Until the call-ups for Iraq, the increasing use of involuntary call-ups of reservists for
peacekeeping operations was considered a desirable trend by many analysts.  These call-ups
were necessary to deploy adequate numbers of personnel with specialized skills required in
post-conflict operations and to relieve over-taxed active duty combat personnel.  In 2000, the
Reserve Component began taking over operations in the Balkans: Guardsmen  assumed
leadership roles in U.S. contingents and Army reservists and guardsmen comprised a large
part of the Balkan contingents. (National Guard generals commanded the U.S. Bosnia SFOR
contingent for its last four years beginning in October 2000, and a National Guard general
was appointed commander of the U.S. KFOR contingent in March 2003.) The National
Guard also provides the battalions that perform peacekeeping duties in the Sinai.
The potential effect of repeated mobilizations on recruitment and retention has been a
longstanding area of concern, even before the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups for duty for
homeland defense.  The subsequent call-ups related to Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
extension of the tours of reservists in Iraq to one year, announced in the fall of 2003, has
intensified concerns.  In July 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed a “rebalancing”
of active and reserve forces in order to reduce reliance on the reserve component during the
first 15 days of a “rapid response operation” and to limit reserve mobilization, especially for
high demand units, to once every six years. (See section on Army Restructuring, below.)  
Debate Over Force Size.   Concerns that the United States does not have sufficient
military forces to maintain a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next year has given
new prominence to the issue of force size. The size of the U.S. military is controversial in
large part because the basic cost of each additional soldier is high, averaging some $100,000
per year for an active duty troop, according to a CBO estimate.  Since the mid-1990s, some
policymakers and military experts have suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be
an appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major
theater wars which was then the standard for sizing force structure and also to engage in
peacekeeping missions.  (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 through
the year of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some 778,000, with
fluctuations.)  Other policymakers would prefer further cuts in personnel in order to conserve
funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems.
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 Retired officers have urged an increase in Army personnel.  On November 6, 2003,
retired Lt. Gen. Theodore G. Stoup Jr., a vice president of the Association of the United
States Army (AUSA), testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the active
army should be increased by some 40,000 over the next few years.  In the November 2003
edition of AUSA’s Army Magazine, retired General Frederick J. Kroesen argued that the
Army should add 100,000 troops: 50,000 “to spell the overworked, overcommitted aviation,
military police, engineer, signal, medical, special operations forces and other high demand
units,” and 50,000 to train replacements.  On January 28, 2004, Secretary of State Rumsfeld
invoked emergency powers to authorize the Army to increase temporarily by 30,000.  
 Congress has recently mandated increases in Army end-strength; they too may be only
temporary. The FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287) funded an Army
end-strength of 482,400 through regular appropriations and an authorized (H.R. 4200/P.L.
108-375) Army FY2005 end-strength increase of 20,000 (to 502,400) through supplemental
appropriations in Title IX.  (According to some defense analysts, the intent of funding the
additional slots through Title IX supplemental appropriations was to make clear that they
were intended to be temporary, not permanent, additions to the force.) The FY2006 DOD
appropriations bill, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee on June 10, 2005
(H.R. 2863, H.Rept. 109-119),  funds a recommended Army end-strength of 482,400, the
same as the President’s request, through the regular personnel appropriations and provides
additional (not supplemental) funding for “Army active duty overstrength” in Title IX.  The
House Armed Services Committee version of the FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R.
1815) calls for an Army end-strength of 512,400, while that of the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S. 1042) calls for 522,400.  (For further information, see CRS Report RS21754,
Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?)  
Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals.  Size is not
the only consideration, and some would argue it is but a secondary consideration, for
providing the capabilities needed for military operations and relieving stress on the armed
forces.   For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces
to increase capabilities for peacekeeping.  Despite the “small-scale contingency missions”
that became a staple of the 1990s and that many argued would constitute a sizable proportion
of future missions, until mid-2003 the Army retained its traditional structure.  This structure
was built around warfighting divisions of 9,000 - 17,000 (although the number of active duty
Army divisions was cut from 18 to ten during the 1990s).  Divisions were divided into three
brigades of combat forces, and separate units of support personnel.  (Support personnel
include “combat support” such as artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, military police,
signal, and military intelligence, and “combat service support” such as supply, maintenance,
transportation, health.)  Other support forces are found “above” the division level in the
Army’s four corps or elsewhere in the active or reserve force.  
For the most part, proposals for reform in the 1990s and early 2000s centered on an
increase in the number of personnel in “low-density, high-demand” units, i.e., those most
heavily taxed by peacekeeping, which are now stressed by “stability” operations in Iraq, and
which to this point have been concentrated in the reserve component.  For several years,
many military analysts suggested that the overall force might be restructured to include more
of the specialities needed for peacekeeping (which some also regard as in short supply for
warfighting or war termination periods), and in units sized for peace operations.  Civil
affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units were frequently
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mentioned as specialties that were particularly needed in peace operations, but were in short
supply in the active military.  As the Army performed increasing numbers of small-scale
contingency missions, analysts noticed that such operations were built around one or two
maneuver brigades (of 2,000+ to 3,000+ troops) with command and support elements drawn
from divisional HQ and elsewhere in the Army.  As a result, some analysts recommended
the development of “maneuver brigades that are prepared for rapid deployment and
autonomous operations.”  (RAND, Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian
Assistance, and Disaster Relief,1998, accessible through [http://www.rand.org] pp 133-134).
Army Restructuring.  In mid-2003, the Army commenced a restructuring of the
Army’s active force and a “rebalancing” of positions between the Army  active and reserve
forces that officials said eventually would involve some 100,000 positions.  (Testimony of
the Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, before the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC), January 28, 2004.) Of these, some 10,000 positions were shifted in 2003, another
20,000 were to be shifted in 2004, and 20,000 more changes were scheduled for FY2005,
according to testimony of DOD Secretary Rumsfeld before the HASC on February 4, 2004.
Further information on changes and plans has not been made available, however.  
The primary reason stated for these changes was to improve the Army’s warfighting
capacity.  Nevertheless, the changes were also viewed as enhancing the Army’s ability to
carry out a broader range of missions — including peacekeeping and related stability
operations, as well as homeland defense — with less stress on the active and reserve forces.
The following three elements of the current restructuring reflect changes have been proposed
to make forces more adept at such operations and have implications for their conduct.
1.  The internal restructuring of divisions to make the Army more mobile (i.e., rapidly
deployable or “expeditionary”) and versatile.  The Army is reconfiguring its ten divisions in
order to make the brigade, instead of the division or corps, the Army’s primary unit of
organization for conducting combat operations.  The reconfiguration incorporates into
combat brigades many or all of the support services necessary to make the brigade more self-
sufficient on the battlefield.  At the same time, the number of combat brigades in each
division increases from three to four.  (The newly configured brigades are referred to as
“units of action.”)  Some divisions may maintain additional support personnel in separate
brigades to be used for “stabilization” tasks in immediate post-conflict situations.  The
formation of these brigades seems similar to RAND’s1998 recommendation for rapidly
deployable and autonomous maneuver brigades for peacekeeping (see above). 
2.  The increase in the active Army of  high demand/low intensity support personnel in
order to support this restructuring and to reduce reliance on and use of the reserve component
(as discussed in the section on reserves, above).   This increase involves the relocation of
such positions from the reserves to the active force, as well as a reshuffling of positions
within the active force.   For instance, at the start of the restructuring, only one of the Army’s
25 civil affairs (CA) battalions was in the active force, while the others were in the Army
Reserve.  (Combat battalions range in size from 600 to 900 troops, while civil affairs units
are somewhat smaller.)  Some CA battalions are now being moved to the active force,
although the primary capability will still reside in the Reserve. Besides CA, specialities being
increased in the active forces that are especially relevant to peacekeeping and related
operations are military police, special operations forces, and certain engineer and
transportation capabilities.  (General  Schoomaker, January 28, 2004 HASC testimony.)   The
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Army is attempting to do this without increasing force size by converting certain combat
positions (such as heavy artillery) and other low-demand specialities into support positions.
3.  Plans also call for the creation of a few thousand new reserve positions, including
positions needed for peacekeeping and related operations, especially military police.  
The effect of these changes on the Army’s ability to perform functions from combat to
peacekeeping and related operations is open to debate.  While some criticize the reforms as
short-term measures primarily geared to deal with the demands of several more years in Iraq
rather than with the combat realities of future battlefields, others might look at them as
insufficient if the Army is to possess the types of forces necessary to carry out peacekeeping
and related stability operations as an inevitable component of its future missions. 
Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study. The Defense Science Board 2004
Summer Study, an unclassified version of which was released in December 2004,
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Services “to reshape and rebalance
their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability” that would meet to the
extent possible the criteria it had set forth.  The Board recommended that stabilization be
treated as an “explicit mission in DOD force planning and not as a lesser included case” and
that stabilization and reconstruction operations “should be given more weight in planning
and programming the future force ....” The Board judged that the “Army is moving in the
right direction with its current initiatives: instituting modularity; restructuring the force to
increase military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other capabilities needed
for S&R operations; and rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve
components.” It recommended, however, that the Army should appoint a senior officer as an
advocate “to ensure that S&R operations receive the same consideration for resources as
other, more traditional, mission areas...”  It also judged that S&R operations would benefit
“if the Army can define modules of S&R capabilities well below the brigade level” and
recommended that the Army experiment with “innovative concepts of task organization and
solutions at the battalion and brigade level.” (Quotes from pp 45-46 and 47.  The document
is available through the Defense Science Board website, [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb]).
NDU 2003 Proposal:  New Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands.
 The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University
(NDU) released, in November 2003, a proposal to redesign the U.S. government’s structures
for planning, organizing, and carrying out stability and reconstruction operations.  A major
focus of Transforming for Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations (accessible through
[http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html]), is a proposal for greater integration of civilian and
military capabilities.  On the military side, this would require the  creation of two new joint
(i.e., composed of members from all military services) “Stabilization and Reconstruction”
commands, one with two permanent HQ units located in the active-duty force, the other
located in the reserves but with an active duty  HQ unit.   Battalion-sized units would be
assigned on a rotating basis to the commands, and would be maintained at a readiness level
for immediate deployment.  (The study estimates the number of troops necessary for a small
stabilization and reconstruction contingency operation at 5,000; for a medium-sized
operation at 15,000; and for a large operation at 30,000.) The study also proposed a
reorganization of military forces to consolidate specialized high demand personnel needed
for such operations and to transfer some of them from reserve to active duty status.  The high
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demand specialties the report mentioned were military police, civil affairs, construction
engineering, medical, and psychological operations (psyops) personnel.
Dedicated Force Proposals Examined by CBO and the Heritage
Foundation.  The U.S. military has long resisted the concept of dedicated peacekeeping
units, fearing that they might divert resources from the rest of the force and arguing that they
would become substandard as good soldiers would not choose to make a career of secondary
missions. Nevertheless, the idea of creating dedicated forces within the U.S. military has
been advanced by some of those who believe that peacekeeping and related stabilization
missions will be a feature of future U.S. security policy and that the creation of dedicated
units would enhance the United States’ ability to successfully conduct such missions by
developing personnel experienced in such operations.  The July 2004 Heritage Foundation
report, Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq, argues that the United States should
not only reorganize and retrain existing combat forces to better equip them to perform
occupational tasks and assist other nations in improving post-conflict capabilities, but also
“build organizations and supporting programs [within the armed forces] specifically designed
to conduct post-conflict duties.” (p. 8)   Another option would be to establish a separate
peacekeeping force, distinct from the current military service branches, although this might
prove quite costly.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has twice examined proposals for dedicated
peacekeeping units.   In a 1999 study, the CBO examined four hypothetical options for
restructuring U.S. forces to perform peace operations with less stress, three of involved
dedicated brigades.  The proposals differed in the extent to which they would enhance
peacekeeping capabilities.  Disadvantages also varied, but in general those that involved no
change in the size of the force would decrease warfighting ability while those that involved
an increase would be more costly.  (Both the December 1999 study, Making Peace While
Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations,
and the May 2005 study, Options for Restructuring the Army, discussed below are accessible
through [http://www.cbo.gov.])  
In its May 2005 study, a proposal for a dedicated divisions was among the eight options
that the CBO examined to address perceived problems with the Army’ capacity to conduct
warfighting and peacekeeping operations, its reliance on reserves, and its ability to deploy
rapidly.  This option proposed converting two current Army divisions, along with their
associated support unit into five “Stabilization and Reconstruction” divisions (four active and
one in the reserves).   The CBO judged that this option might provide a qualitative advantage
as “the mix of soldiers in each S&R division [to include military police, engineers, medical,
civil affairs, and psychological operations units] might be superior to the Army’s current
combat forces for peacekeeping, given their specialities and the historical demand for those
types of units in peacekeeping missions.” (p. 33)  The CBO noted, however, that it was
unable to determine the appropriate mix of combat soldiers, needed to establish secure
conditions, and other types of forces. It would also require a slightly lower level of reserve
mobilization to sustain extended deployments, and would decrease future investment and
annual operation and support costs.  On the other hand, this option “would be less capable
of fighting multiple wars simultaneously” because it would have six fewer combat brigades
and “might have to send fewer forces to any given conflict.” (p. 33) 
   
IB94040 06-15-05
CRS-16
DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)





AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 38,322.0 38,322.0 50,188.3  NA 
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch 634.9 138.2 88.9 93.1 136.0 156.4 143.7 148.6
1,372.4 626.2 11,023.3  —  — Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force 1,048.9 468.4 576.3 597.3 1,497.2 954.8 755.4 963.5
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring  —  —  — 102.7 5.6 13.8 239.8 261.6
Vigilant Warrior  — 257.7  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 257.7  —  — 
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98)  —  —  —  —  — 43.5  —  —  —  — 43.5  —  — 
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)  —  —  —  —  — 92.9  —  —  —  — 92.9  —  — 
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group) 32.4  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 32.4  —  — 
     Total Southwest Asia/Iraq 1,716.2 864.3 665.2 793.1 1,638.8 1,261.4 1,138.9 1,373.5 1,372.4 38,948.2 49,771.8 50,188.3 NA
Afghanistan   (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) 15,788.1 15,788.1 7,980.0 436.9
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge 2,231.7 2,087.5 1,792.8 1,431.2 1,381.8 1,213.4
932.9 742.2 13,586.8 868.7 768.4Other Former Yugoslavia Operations* 436.6 347.4 288.3 195.0 169.9 155.4 101.3 79.4
     Total Bosnia 436.6 347.4 2,520.0 2,282.5 1,962.7 1,586.6 1,483.1 1,292.6 932.9 742.2 13,586.8 868.7 768.4
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War) 34.6  —  —  —  — 34.6  —  — 
Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99) 20.3  —  —  —  — 20.3  —  — 
Noble Anvil (Air War) 1,891.4  —  —  —  — 1,891.4  —  — 
Joint Guardian (KFOR) 1,044.5 1,803.1 1,383.9 938.2 590.4 4,886.2 726.1 669.7
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance) 141.6  —  —  —  — 141.6  —  — 
     Total Kosovo 3,132.4 1,803.1 1,383.9 938.2 590.4 7,848.0 726.1 669.7
Korea Readiness*  69.7 90.9  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 160.6  —  — 
COMPLETED OPERATIONS   (Includes Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor, and Liberia)
  Subtotal Completed Operations 1,867.0 591.2 86.9  —  — 1.5 56.8  —  — 3.1 2,606.5 4.9  — 
GRAND TOTALS 4,089.5 1,893.8 3,272.1 3,075.6 3,601.5 5,981.9 4,481.8 4,050.0 3,243.5 56,072.0 89,761.8 59,768.0 NA
Source: Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations
and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005.  As of June 15, 2005, DOD has not made updated information available for FY2004, FY2005, and FY2006.
Notes: This chart consists of  DOD  incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations
(including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations.   U.N. reimbursements are not deducted.
Some totals do not add due to rounding.  Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise
(humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge.  Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there
as incremental costs.  NA=Not Available.
